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Abstract
This paper studies attack-resilient estimation of a class of switched nonlinear systems subject to stochastic noises. The systems
are threatened by both of signal attacks and switching attacks. The problem is formulated as the joint estimation of states,
attack vectors and modes of hidden-mode switched systems. We propose an estimation algorithm which is composed of a bank
of state and attack vector estimators and a mode estimator. The mode estimator selects the most likely mode based on modes’
posterior probabilities induced by the discrepancies between obtained outputs and predicted outputs. We formally analyze the
stability of estimation errors in probability for the proposed estimator associated with the true mode when the hidden mode
is time-invariant but remains unknown. For hidden-mode switched linear systems, we discuss a way to reduce computational
complexity which originates from unknown signal attack locations. Lastly, we present numerical simulations on the IEEE
68-bus test system to show the estimator performance for time-varying modes with a regular mode set and a reduced mode set.
1 Introduction
Cyber-Physical Systems (CPS) are systems which in-
tegrate control systems with advanced technologies of
sensing, computation and communication. The integra-
tion leads to highly automated and collaborative ap-
plications such as autonomous vehicles, remote patient
monitoring, and smart grid. Due to such potentials,
the significance on CPS is emphasized by the Presi-
dent’s Council of Advisors on Science and Technology
at 2010 [13].
Security is of vital importance for CPS. Especially, be-
cause of the couplings between the cyber layer and physi-
cal layer, CPS bear vulnerabilities to cyberattacks which
may cause irreparable damage to the physical layer [4].
For example, a natural gas flow control system in Rus-
sia was temporarily seized in 2000 and a sewage control
system in Australia was attacked in the same year [33].
According to early studies on CPS security, the types
of possible attacks on CPS can be categorized into sig-
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nal attacks and switching attacks. Signal attacks in-
clude sensor attacks which tamper with sensor readings
and actuator attacks which tamper with control com-
mands. While signal attacks modify the magnitudes or
timings [42,43] of signals, switching attacks alter system
structures [36,39]. The attacks can be launched via com-
munication jamming and malware; e.g., Trojan.
Literature review. One topic in CPS security focuses
on identifying fundamental limitations on the detectabil-
ity of attacks. Paper [25] investigates the possibilities
that attacks can bypass detection algorithms for power
systems. Undetectable attack spaces on linear systems
are characterized in [30]. A number of attack detectors
against signal attacks are designed. In particular, at-
tack detection problems for deterministic linear systems
are formalized into `0/`∞ optimization problems [7,30].
Due to non-convexity, the problems are NP-hard [30].
To address the computational challenges, paper [7] pro-
poses convex relaxations of the optimization problems.
It is analyzed in [28] that a state estimator based on
`0 optimization is robust with respect to modeling er-
rors caused by sampling, computation/actuation jitter,
and synchronization. Paper [26] uses the Kalman fil-
ter to conduct attack-resilient state estimation in the
presence of stochastic noises. Paper [32] proposes a
multi-modal Luenberger observer whose memory us-
age increases linearly with the number of states and
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outputs. Papers [25,26,28,32] consider sensor attacks,
and papers [7,30] consider both sensor and actuator
attacks. Paper [39] designs an attack-resilient estimator
for stochastic linear systems in the presence of sensor
attacks, actuator attacks, and switching attacks. All
aforementioned papers focus on linear systems.
Our attack-resilient estimator design method is based
on simultaneous unknown Input and State Estimation
(ISE). Early research of this area focuses on state esti-
mation without estimating unknown inputs [5,14]. Un-
biased and minimum variance unknown input and state
estimators are designed for linear systems without direct
feedthrough matrix [15] and with full-column rank di-
rect feedthrough matrix [9,38], and with rank-deficient
direct feedthrough matrix [40]. Noticeably, this set of
papers is restricted to linear systems.
Contributions. In this paper, we consider a class
of switched nonlinear stochastic systems under sig-
nal attacks and switching attacks. We formulate the
attack-resilient estimation problem as the simultaneous
estimation of states, attack vectors and hidden modes.
The proposed algorithm associates an estimator to each
mode and the estimators share the same structure. Each
estimator recursively produces the estimates of states
and attack vectors. The mode estimator selects the most
likely mode based on modes’ posteriori probabilities
found by the discrepancies between obtained outputs
and predicted outputs. For the special case where the
hidden mode is fixed but remains unknown, it is shown
that the estimation errors of states and attack vectors
of the true mode satisfy Practically Exponentially Sta-
ble in probability (PESp) like properties. In addition,
we discuss a way to reduce computational complexity
by reducing the number of modes for switched linear
stochastic systems, which maintains the minimal num-
ber of modes to achieve the same detection capabilities
as the power set. On the IEEE 68-bus test system,
numerical simulations are conducted to show the ef-
fectiveness of the proposed algorithm on time-varying
modes with a regular mode set and a reduced mode set.
Towards our best knowledge, this is the first time to
systematically study unknown input, state, and mode
estimation of switched nonlinear stochastic systems.
This paper is enriched from preliminary version [18] and
includes a set of new results. In particular, this paper dis-
cusses how to reduce computational complexity caused
by unknown signal attack locations. An additional nu-
merical simulation is conduct to show the estimator per-
formance for reduced mode sets. Lastly, this paper con-
tains all the proofs which were omitted in [18].
Paper organization. A motivating example of CPS
model and attack model is introduced in Section 2.
Section 3 introduces system model, attack model and
defender’s knowledge. Moreover, the state, attack vec-
tor, and mode estimation problem is formulated in
the same section. We propose Nonlinear unknown In-
put, State and Mode Estimator (NISME) to solve the
estimation problem in Section 4. The stability of the
proposed estimator is formally analyzed in Section 5.
Section 6 discusses a way to reduce computational com-
plexity caused by unknown signal attack locations, for
switched stochastic linear systems. Section 7 offers nu-
merical simulations on the IEEE 68-bus test system to
show the performance of the proposed NISME with a
regular mode set and a reduced mode set. We present
the derivations and proofs of the proposed estimator in
Section 8.
Notations. Given a vector ak, we use aˆk and a˜k to
denote an estimate of ak and induced estimation error
a˜k = ak− aˆk, respectively. Its error covariance is defined
by P ak , E[a˜ka˜Tk ], and cross error covariance with bk is
P abk , E[a˜k b˜Tk ] = (P bak )T .
We use the following definition for filter stability of non-
linear systems.
Definition 1.1 Stochastic process x(t) is said to be
Practically Exponentially Stable in probability (PESp) if
for any γ ∈ (0, 1), there exist positive constants α, b, c,
and δ such that, for any ‖x(0)‖ ≤ δ, the following holds
for all t ≥ 0:
P (‖x(t)‖ < αe−bt‖x(0)‖+ c) ≥ 1− γ.
PESp is a special case of stochastic input-to-state stabil-
ity [24] when input is absent and class KL function is ex-
ponential in t and linear in ‖x(0)‖. In addition, PESp is
also extended from global asymptotic stability in prob-
ability (Definition 3.1 in [22]). Notice that the stability
notions in [22,24] are global and PESp is local.
As for linear systems, one of the sufficient conditions for
filter stability is uniform observability.
Definition 1.2 [3] The pair (Ck, Ak) is uniformly ob-
servable if and only if there exist positive constants a, b, l,
for all k ≥ 0, such that, for all k ≥ 0, aI ≤Mk+l,k ≤ bI
whereMk+l,k ,
∑k+l
i=k Φi,kCiC
T
i Φ
T
i,k is the observability
gramian and Φk1,k0 is the state transition matrix.
Uniform observability reduces to observability if the lin-
ear system is time-invariant.
2 Motivating example
A power network is represented by undirected graph
(V, E) with the set of buses V , {1, · · · , N} and the set
of transmission lines E ⊆ V × V. The set of neighbor-
ing buses of i ∈ V is Si , {l ∈ V \ {i}|(i, l) ∈ E}. Each
bus is either a generator bus i ∈ G, or a load bus i ∈ L.
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The dynamic of bus i with attacks is described as the
following switched nonlinear system:
θ˙i(t) = fi(t) + w1,i(t)
f˙i(t) = − 1
mi
(
Difi(t) +
∑
l∈Si
P
jil(t)
il (t)
− (PMi(t) + da,i(t)) + PLi(t)
)
+ w2,i(t) (1)
with the output model
yi,k = [Peleci,k, θi,k, fi,k]
T + ds,i,k + vi,k (2)
adopted from Chapter 9 in [37] adding a phase angle
measurement as [6,31]. System states θi(t), fi(t) are
phase angle and angular frequency, respectively. Mode
index jil(t) ∈ {0, 1} represents on/off of the power line
connection between buses i and l; i.e., power flow is
P 1il(t) = −P 1li(t) = til sin(θi(t) − θl(t)), and P 0il(t) =−P 0li(t) = 0. The values PLi(t), and Peleci(t) = PLi(t) +
Difi(t) denote power demand, and electrical power out-
put, respectively. Since power demand PLi(t) can be ob-
tained by many load forecasting methods [1,11], it is as-
sumed to be known.
Mechanical power PMi(t) is the control input for i ∈ G
and is assumed to be zero at load bus i ∈ L. Power
demand can be divided into elastic demand PELi(t) and
inelastic demand P IELi (t) as shown in [2]; i.e., PLi(t) =
PELi(t)+P
IE
Li
(t). Elastic demand PELi(t) can be controlled
via power pricing. Since we assume that the current load
is known, we simplify that load bus i ∈ L uses PLi(t) as
load controller.
The measurements are sampled at discrete instants due
to hardware constraints. We use subscript k ∈ Z≥0 to
denote an instantaneous value at the discrete sampling
time tk; e.g., fi(tk) = fi,k.
An attacker is assumed to be able to modify the sen-
sor measurements, control commands, and trigger the
power flow line switches. The possible attacks are mod-
eled as vectors ds,i,k ∈ R, da,i(t) ∈ R, and hidden mode
switch jil(t) which represent sensor attacks [26,30], ac-
tuator attacks [7,30,43], and circuit breaking/switching
attacks [36,39], respectively.
3 Problem formulation
System model. Consider the hidden-mode nonlinear
stochastic system
x˙(t) = f ′(x(t), u(t) + da(t), w′(t), j(t), t), x(t) ∈ Cj(t)
(x(t), j(t))+ = Ω′(x(t), j(t)), x(t) ∈ Dj(t)
yk = h(xk, uk + da,k, v
′
k, jk, tk) + ds,k (3)
where x(t) ∈ Rn, yk ∈ Rm, u(t) ∈ Rs, and j(t) ∈MI are
state, output, input, and hidden-mode, respectively. We
use subscript k ∈ Z≥0 to denote an instantaneous value
at the discrete sampling time tk. Vectors da(t) ∈ Rs, and
ds,k ∈ Rm are actuator attack vector and sensor attack
vector, respectively. Sets Cj(t), Dj(t) ⊆ Rn denote flow
set and jump set, respectively, and Ω is a mode transition
function. For each mode, process noise w′(t) ∈ Rs1 and
measurement noise v′k ∈ Rs2 are uncorrelated with each
other. The system is a continuous-discrete system be-
cause, while the physical dynamic evolves in continuous
time, sensor measurements are obtained at their corre-
sponding sampling instants due to hardware constraints.
We define a uniform sampling period as  = tk − tk−1.
It is assumed that the system (3) has a unique solu-
tion. One of the sufficient condition for the unique solu-
tion is weak one-sided local Lipschitz condition on func-
tion f ′(·) in the open time interval of each mode dura-
tion [35] and other conditions can be found in the refer-
ences therein. The system model (3) includes the power
system model (1) with (2) as a special case.
Attack model. Signal attacks are comprised of sig-
nal magnitude attacks (i.e., the attacker injects attack
signals), and signal location attacks (i.e., the attacker
chooses targeted sensors/actuators). Signal attacks are
modeled by da(t) and ds,k where zero values indicate that
the corresponding actuators and sensors are free of at-
tacks and non-zero values represent attack magnitudes.
Switching attacks change system modes following Ω′.
Knowledge of the defender. The defender is unaware
of which actuators/sensors are under attacks and what
the current mode is. The defender knows dynamic sys-
tem model and output model (4) for each mode but not
the mode transition function Ω′. Mode set MI is also
known to the defender. The attack vectors da(t), ds,k,
mode j(t) and its transitions are inaccessible to the de-
fender. Noise vectors w′(t), v′k are unknown but their
auto covariance matrices are known.
Objective. The defender aims to answer the following
three questions:
(a) if any sensor or actuator is attacked;
(b) if so, which ones are attacked, and how much sensor
readings and control commands are tampered with;
(c) what current system states are.
The above problem can be formulated as a joint estima-
tion of states, attack vectors and modes of hidden-mode
switched systems (3).
4 Estimator design
In order to reflect real world, system (3) models the at-
tacks from the attacker’s point of view and captures at-
tack sources. In order to solve the estimation problem,
we need to model the attacks from the defender’s point
of view and captures attack consequences. In particular,
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we rewrite system (3) as follows:
x˙(t) = f(x(t), u(t), d(t), w′(t), j(t), t), x(t) ∈ Cj(t)
(x(t), j(t))+ = Ω(x(t), j(t)), x(t) ∈ Dj(t)
yk = h(xk, uk, v
′
k, jk, tk) +H
jkdk (4)
where d(t) = [dTa (t), d
′T
s (t)]
T ∈ Rs+m, d′s,k = h(xk, uk +
da,k, v
′
k, jk, tk) − h(xk, uk, v′k, jk, tk) + ds,k, f(x(t), u(t),
d(t), w′(t), j(t), t) = f ′(x(t), u(t) + Sj(t)d(t), w′(t),
j(t), t), Sj(t) = [K
j(t)
S , 0
s×m] ∈ {0, 1}s×(s+m) and
Hjk = [0m×s,KjkH ] ∈ {0, 1}m×(s+m). The defender
models the signal location attacks as mode j(t) of diag-
onal matrix
Kj ,
[
Sj
Hj
]
=
[
KjS 0
s×m
0m×s KjH
]
∈ {0, 1}(s+m)×(s+m)
where Kj(i, i) = 1 if mode j assumes that the ith lo-
cation is under attack; otherwise, Kj(i, i) = 0. Thus,
j(t) ∈M = MA×MI stands for the both signal location
attacks MA and switching attacks MI .
Remark 4.1 For the sake of generality, we will consider
arbitrary Kj ∈ R(s+m)×(s+m) in the remaining of this
section and Sections 5. 
To solve the problem, we propose Nonlinear unknown
Input, State and Mode Estimator (NISME). The NISME
consists of a bank of Nonlinear unknown Input and State
estimators (NISE) and a mode estimator as shown in
Figure 1. Each NISE is associated with a particular mode
Fig. 1. Scheme of NISME
and recursively estimates the states and attack vectors
under the fixed mode. The mode estimator calculates the
posteriori probabilities of the modes by observing output
discrepancies from predicted outputs, and chooses the
most likely one. Lastly, the NISME outputs the estimates
of the states and the attack vectors of the selected mode.
We first introduce some preliminaries for the NISE in
Section 4.1. The NISME is presented in Section 4.2.
4.1 Preliminaries
In this section, we introduce an output decomposition
used in the NISE. Since each NISE is associated with a
particular mode, we omit the mode index j(t) for nota-
tional simplicity.
We first discretize and linearize system (4) as follows
with constant sampling period :
xk+1 = xk + f(xk, uk, dk, w
′
k, tk) + ρk
' xk + (Akxk +Bkuk +Gkdk + ρk + wk)
yk ' Ckxk +Dkuk +Hdk + vk (5)
where ρk ,
∫ tk+1
tk
f(x(τ), u(τ), d(τ), w′(τ), τ)dτ −
f(xk, uk, dk, w
′
k, tk) refers to discretization error, and
wk = Jkw
′
k, vk = Ekv
′
k,
Ak ,
∂fk
∂x
∣∣
xˆk|k,uk,dˆk,0,tk
, Bk ,
∂fk
∂u
∣∣
xˆk|k,uk,dˆk,0,tk
,
Gk ,
∂fk
∂d
∣∣
xˆk|k,uk,dˆk,0,tk
, Jk ,
∂fk
∂w′
∣∣
xˆk|k,uk,dˆk,0,tk
,
Ck ,
∂hk
∂x
∣∣
xˆk|k−1,uk,0,tk
, Dk ,
∂hk
∂u
∣∣
xˆk|k−1,uk,0,tk
,
Ek ,
∂hk
∂v′
∣∣
xˆk|k−1,uk,0,tk
.
We define the autocovariance matrices for noise vectors
as E[wkwTk ] = Qk ≥ 0, and E[vkvTk ] = Rk > 0.
Now we introduce two coordinate transformations. The
first one is based on the singular value decomposition
H =
[
U1 U2
] [Σ 0
0 0
][
V T1
V T2
]
where Σ is a full rank diagonal matrix. The first coordi-
nate transformation Tk is defined by
Tk =
[
T1,k
T2
]
=
[
I −UT1 RkU2(UT2 RkU2)−1
0 I
][
UT1
UT2
]
.
(6)
Likewise, the singular value decomposition
T2CkGk−1V2 =
[
U¯1,k U¯2,k
] [ Σ¯k 0
0 0
][
V¯ T1,k
V¯ T2,k
]
with full-rank diagonal matrix Σ¯k induces the second
coordinate transformation T¯k = [T¯
T
1,k, T¯
T
2,k]
T
T¯k =
[
I −U¯T1,kR¯kU¯2,k(U¯T2,kR¯kU¯2,k)−1
0 I
][
U¯T1,k
U¯T2,k
]
(7)
where R¯k , T2RkTT2 . From coordinate transforma-
tions (6) and (7), the output yk in (5) can be decom-
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posed as follows:
z1,k = T1,kyk ' C1,kxk +D1,kuk +H1d1,k + v1,k
z2,k = T¯1,kT2yk ' C2,kxk +D2,kuk + v2,k
' C2,k(xk−1 + (Ak−1xk−1 +Bk−1uk−1
+Gk−1dk−1 + wk−1)) +D2,kuk + v2,k
z3,k = T¯2,kT2yk ' C3,kxk +D3,kuk + v3,k (8)
where H1 = Σ and C2,kGk−1V2 = Σ¯k. Attack vec-
tor dk is decomposed into a sum of d1,k , V T1 dk and
d2,k , V T2 dk where they are orthogonal to each other.
Note that d1,k and d2,k are different from d
′
s,k and da,k,
and introduced for the purpose of analysis. In this case, it
holds thatGkdk = G1,kd1,k+G2,kd2,k withG1,k , GkV1
and G2,k , GkV2. Output z1,k is the portion of yk which
is attacked at k; i.e., z1,k includes d1,k in (8). Outputs
z2,k and z3,k are the portions of yk and are free of at-
tacks at k, where output z2,k reflects d2,k indirectly be-
cause C2,kGk−1dk−1 = Σ¯. Thus, decomposed outputs
z1,k, z2,k, and z3,k are used to estimate d1,k, d2,k−1, and
xk, respectively.
Because d2,k−1 is not measured by yk−1, output z2,k =
C2,kG2,k−1d2,k−1 + ... in (8) is instead used to estimate
d2,k−1; i.e., matrices C2,k and G2,k−1 must be known to
estimate attack vector d2,k−1. However, in (5), matrix
G2,k−1 is obtained by linearizing f(·) using dˆ2,k−1, and
matrix Ck is obtained by linearizing h(·) using xˆk|k−1,
where these linearizations cannot be done without know-
ing dˆ2,k−1. Thus, we have the following assumption.
Assumption 4.1 Dynamic system model (4) can be ex-
pressed as
x˙(t) = f(x(t), u(t), d1(t), w
′(t), t) +G2(t)d2(t)
z1,k = T1,kyk = h1(xk, uk, v
′
1,k, tk) +H1d1,k
z2,k = T¯1,kT2,kyk = C2,kxk + h2(uk, v
′
2,k, tk)
z3,k = T¯2,kT2,kyk = h3(xk, uk, v
′
3,k, tk). (9)
With Assumption 4.1, the dynamic system (5) becomes
xk+1 = xk + f(xk, uk, d1,k, w
′
k, tk) + G2,kd2,k + ρk
' xk + (Akxk +Bkuk +G1,kd1,k +G2,kd2,k + ρk
+ wk) (10)
where matrices Ak, Bk, G1,k, and Jk can be obtained
before having an estimate for d2,k. Output equation (9)
is linearized into (8) where noises v1,k = E1,kv
′
1,k, v2,k =
E2,kv
′
2,k, v3,k = E3,kv
′
3,k are uncorrelated with each
other and
C1,k ,
∂h1,k
∂x
∣∣
xˆk|k−1,uk,0,tk
, C3,k ,
∂h3,k
∂x
∣∣
xˆk|k−1,uk,0,tk
,
D1,k ,
∂h1,k
∂u
∣∣
xˆk|k−1,uk,0,tk
, D2,k ,
∂h2,k
∂u
∣∣
uk,0,tk
,
D3,k ,
∂h3,k
∂u
∣∣
xˆk|k−1,uk,0,tk
, E1,k ,
∂h1,k
∂v′1
∣∣
xˆk|k−1,uk,0,tk
,
E2,k ,
∂h2,k
∂v′2
∣∣
uk,0,tk
, E3,k ,
∂h3,k
∂v′3
∣∣
xˆk|k−1,uk,0,tk
.
4.2 Algorithm statement
Fig. 2. The recursive estimation scheme of the NISE.
Consider the NISE (Algorithm 1) as well as Figure 2
whose derivation is presented in Section 8.1 in details.
All the estimates of states and attack vectors are best
linear unbiased estimates (BLUE); i.e., the estimator
gains are chosen such that the estimates are unbiased
and the norms of the error covariance matrices are mini-
mized. Since attack vector d2,k−1 does not influence out-
put yk−1 directly, output z
j
2,k is used to estimate attack
vector d2,k−1 (line 2) by using previous estimate of attack
vector d1,k−1. Error covariance matrix P
d2,j
k−1 of attack
vector estimate dˆj2,k−1 is derived in line 3. Applying the
previous state and attack vector estimates to dynamic
system (4), the current state is predicted (line 4). Error
covariance matrix P x,jk|k−1 of the predicted state xˆ
j
k|k−1
is found in line 5 and the matrices in line 5 are defined
by Q¯jk−1 , E[w¯
j
k−1(w¯
j
k−1)
T ],
w¯jk−1 , (I − Gj2,k−1M j2,kCj2,k)
× (wjk−1 −Gj1,k−1M j1vj1,k−1)− Gj2,k−1M j2,kvj2,k
A¯jk−1 , (I − Gj2,k−1M j2,kCj2,k)
× (I + Ajk−1 − Gj1,k−1M j1Cj1,k−1). (11)
We correct the predicted state using the measurement
bias (line 7) between the measured output and the pre-
dicted output. Error covariance matrix P x,jk|k−1 of state
prediction xˆjk|k−1 is updated in line 8. Attack vector d1,k
is estimated from output zj1,k (line 10). Error covariance
matrix P d1,jk−1 of attack vector estimate dˆ
j
1,k, and cross
error covariance matrix P xd1,jk with xˆ
j
k|k are found in
lines 11-12. Lastly, the NISE generates the priori prob-
ability N jk (line 15) of the mode to find the most likely
mode, where nj , Rank(P¯ jk|k−1). For this purpose, the
discrepancy between the measured output zj3,k and the
predicted output is used to validate the mode (line 13)
because they should match if j is the true mode. Since
the system is nonlinear, the discrepancy νjk may not be
5
Algorithm 1 NISE
Input: j, xˆjk−1|k−1, dˆ
j
1,k−1, P
x,j
k−1, P
d1,j
k−1 , P
xd1,j
k−1 , yk, u(t)
for t ∈ [tk−1, tk];
. Attack vector dj2,k−1 estimation
1: M j2,k = (C
j
2,kG
j
2,k−1)
−1 (or M j2,k = 0 if
Rank(Σ¯k) = 0);
2: dˆj2,k−1 = M
j
2,k(z
j
2,k − Cj2,k(xˆjk−1|k−1 + f(xˆjk−1|k−1,
uk−1, dˆ
j
1,k−1, 0, j, tk−1))− h2(uk, 0, j, tk));
3: P d2,jk−1 = M
j
2,kC
j
2,k(I + A
j
k−1)P
j
k−1 (M
j
2,kC
j
2,k(I +
Ajk−1))
T+2M j2,kC
j
2,kQ
j
k−1(M
j
2,k C
j
2,k)
T+M j2,kR
j
2,k
(M j2,k)
T + 2Cj2,kG
j
1,k−1P
d1,j
k−1 (C
j
2,kG
j
1,k−1)
T +
M j2,kC
j
2,k(I + A
j
k−1)P
xd1,j
k−1 (C
j
2,kG
j
1,k−1)
T +
Cj2,kG
j
1,k−1P
d1x,j
k−1 (M
j
2,kC
j
2,k(I + A
j
k−1))
T ;
. State prediction
4: ˙ˆxj(t) = f(xˆj(t), u(t), dˆj1,k−1, 0, j, t) + G
j
2,k−1dˆ
j
2,k−1
with initial condition xˆjk−1|k−1 for t ∈ (tk−1, tk] to
have xˆjk|k−1 at t = tk;
5: P x,jk|k−1 = A¯
j
k−1P
x,j
k−1(A¯
j
k−1)
T + Q¯jk−1;
. State estimation
6: Ljk = P
x,j
k|k−1(C
j
3,k)
T (Cj3,kP
x,j
k|k−1(C
j
3,k)
T +Rj3,k)
−1;
7: xˆjk|k = xˆ
j
k|k−1 + L
j
k(z
j
3,k − h3(xˆjk|k−1, uk, 0, j, tk));
8: P x,jk = (I − LjkCj3,k)P x,jk|k−1(I − LjkCj3,k)T +
LjkR
j
3,k(L
j
k)
T ;
. Attack vector dj1,k estimation
9: M j1 = (H
j
1)
−1 (or M j1 = 0 if Rank(Σ) = 0);
10: dˆj1,k = M
j
1 (z
j
1,k − h1(xˆjk|k, uk, 0, j, tk));
11: P d1,jk = M
j
1C
j
1,kP
x,j
k (M
j
1C
j
1,k)
T +M j1R
j
1,k(M
j
1 )
T ;
12: P xd1,jk = −P x,jk (M j1Cj1,k)T ;
. The priori probability of the mode
13: νjk = z
j
3,k − h3(xˆjk|k−1, uk, 0, j, tk);
14: P¯ jk|k−1 = C
j
3,kP
j
k|k−1(C
j
3,k)
T +Rj3,k;
15: N jk = 1(2pi)nj/2|P¯ j
k|k−1|1/2
exp(− (ν
j
k
)T (P¯ j
k|k−1)
−1νj
k
2 );
Return: xˆjk|k, dˆ
j
1,k, dˆ
j
2,k−1, P
x,j
k , P
d2,j
k−1 , P
d1,j
k , P
xd1,j
k ,
N jk .
Gaussian. We approximate νjk as a Gaussian random
vector because it is a typical practice to approximate an
unknown noise as a Gaussian distribution as [21]. More-
over, νjk is Gaussian when the system is linear and noises
wjk and v
j
k are Gaussian. Covariance matrix P¯
j
k|k−1 of
the discrepancy νjk is found in line 14.
Now consider the NISME (Algorithm 2) which is derived
in Section 8.2. The NISME runs the NISE for each mode
j ∈ M in parallel to generate the state and attack vec-
tor estimates along with the priori probability for each
Algorithm 2 NISME
Input: xˆj0|0 = E[x0], P
x,j
0 = P0, µ
j
0 =
1
|M| , dˆ
j
1,0 =
(Σj)−1(zj1,0−h1(xˆj0|0, u0, 0, j, 0)) for ∀j ∈M; Choose
0 < δ  1|M| , 0 < α1 < 1, 0 < α2 < 1 (significance
levels);
1: for k = 1 : N do
2: Read sensor output yk, and control input u(t) for
t ∈ [tk−1, tk];
3: for j ∈M do
4: Run the NISE with input (j, xˆjk−1|k−1, dˆ
j
1,k−1,
P x,jk−1, P
d1,j
k−1 , P
xd1,j
k−1 , yk, u(t) for t ∈ [tk−1, tk]) to
generate output (xˆjk|k, dˆ
j
1,k, dˆ
j
2,k−1, P
x,j
k , P
d2,j
k−1 ,
P d1,jk , P
xd1,j
k , N jk );
5: end for
.Mode estimator
6: for j ∈M do
7: µ¯jk = max{
N j
k
µj
k−1∑|M|
i=1
N i
k
µi
k−1
, δ};
8: end for
9: for j ∈M do
10: µjk =
µ¯j
k∑|M|
i=1
µ¯i
k
;
11: end for
12: Set jˆk = argmaxj µ
j
k;
13: Obtain χ2
|dˆjˆk
1,k
|
(α1) and χ
2
|dˆjˆk
2,k−1|
(α2);
14: if (dˆjˆk1,k)
T (P d1,jˆkk )
−1dˆjˆk1,k < χ
2
|dˆjˆk
1,k
|
(α1) and
(dˆjˆk2,k−1)
T (P d2,jˆkk−1 )
−1dˆjˆk2,k−1 < χ
2
|dˆjˆk
2,k−1|
(α2) then
15: Set jˆtruek as signal attack-free mode of jˆk;
16: dˆjˆk1,k = dˆ
jˆk
2,k−1 = 0;
17: end if
18: Return:
jˆ(t) = jˆtruek for t ∈ (tk−1, tk],
xˆ(t) = xˆjˆkk|k, t ∈ (tk−1, tk],
dˆ1(t) = dˆ
jˆk
1,k for t ∈ [tk, tk+1),
dˆ2(t) = dˆ
jˆk
2,k−1 for t ∈ (tk−1, tk].
19: end for
mode (line 4). After then, the algorithm identifies the
most likely mode (lines 6-11). By the Bayes’ theorem,
the posteriori probability µjk is updated by a linear com-
bination of the priori probabilities (line 7). It is not de-
sirable that some mode probabilities vanish over time
because the true modes might be time-varying. A lower
bound δ is adopted in line 7 to prevent the vanishment
of the mode probabilities. After the lower bound is ap-
plied, the mode probability is normalized in line 10. The
mode with the largest posteriori probability µjk is cho-
6
sen as a current mode (line 12), and the attack vectors
of the current mode are tested by Chi-square hypoth-
esis tests (p.354 in [29]) with significance levels α1, α2
to determine whether they are statistically significant
or not (line 14). Specifically, we have the following null-
hypothesis and alternative hypothesis
H0 : d1,k = 0 and d2,k−1 = 0
H1 : d1,k 6= 0 or d2,k−1 6= 0
with samples dˆjˆk1,k and dˆ
jˆk
2,k−1. Chi-square value is pre-
sented as χ2df (α) where df and α are the degree of free-
dom and significance level, respectively. If it is not sta-
tistically significant, the algorithm chooses the signal
attack-free mode as a current mode. The corresponding
state and attack vector estimates are returned (line 18).
Due to limited measurements over the continuous-time
dynamic system model, we use the approximation that
the attack vector estimates are constants during a sam-
pling period, in lines 2,4,10 of the NISE, and lines 18 of
the NISME. We, however, will consider approximation
errors in the analysis.
5 Analysis
In this section, we analyze that the state and attack vec-
tor estimation errors of the proposed estimator satisfy
PESp-like properties. The properties in this section are
guaranteed for the true mode when the hidden mode is
fixed but remains unknown.
Recall that we use the approximation that the attack
vector estimates are constants during a sampling period.
In addition, we assume that the attack vectors are con-
tinuous in a sampling period, and their gradients are
uniformly bounded.
Assumption 5.1 Attack vector d(t) is continuous, and
its slope is uniformly bounded; i.e., there exists a positive
constant d¯ such that
sup
t1,t2≥0
‖(d(t1)− d(t2))/(t1 − t2)‖ ≤ d¯.
Some required notations are introduced below. It is ob-
vious that wk shown in (10) is uncorrelated with v1,k,
v2,k, or v3,k. Noise vectors v1,k, v2,k, and v3,k are also
uncorrelated with each others because
R1,k = E[v1,kvT1,k] = T1,kRkTT1,k > 0
R2,k = E[v2,kvT2,k] = T¯2,kT2RkTT2 T¯T2,k > 0
R3,k = E[v3,kvT3,k] = T¯1,kT2RkTT2 T¯T1,k > 0
R12,k = E[v1,kvT2,k] = (UT1 RkUT2 − UT1 RkUT2
× (UT2 RkUT2 )−1UT2 RkUT2 )T¯T2,k = 0
R13,k = E[v1,kvT3,k] = (UT1 RkUT2 − UT1 RkUT2
× (UT2 RkUT2 )−1UT2 RkUT2 )T¯T1,k = 0
R23,k = E[v2,kvT3,k] = U¯T1,kT2RkTT2 U¯T2,k − U¯T1,kRkU¯T2,k
× (U¯T2,kRkU¯T2,k)−1U¯T2,kT2RkTT2 U¯T2,k = 0.
We introduce the linearization errors φk, ψ1,k, ψ2,k, and
ψ3,k for the stability analysis:
f(xk, uk, d1,k, w
′
k, tk)− f(xˆk|k, uk, dˆ1,k, 0, tk)
= Akx˜k|k +G1,kd˜1,k + wk + φk(xˆk|k, xk, uk, w′k, v
′
k)
h1(xk, uk, v
′
k, tk)− h1(xˆk|k, uk, 0, tk)
= C1,kx˜k|k + v1,k + ψ1,k(xˆk|k, xk, uk, v′k)
h2(uk, v
′
k, tk)− h2(uk, 0, tk)
= v2,k + ψ2,k(uk, v
′
k)
h3(xk, uk, v
′
k, tk)− h3(xˆk|k−1, uk, 0, tk)
= C3,kx˜k|k−1 + v3,k + ψ3,k(xˆk|k−1, xk, uk, v′k) (12)
where φk is a function of d˜1,k and d˜1,k is a function of
x˜k|k and v′k. We omit the arguments of the linearization
errors in the rest of the paper. The linearization errors
can not be used to estimate the states and attack vectors,
since they include unknown variables xk, w
′
k, and v
′
k.
Now consider the following assumptions.
Assumption 5.2 There exist positive constants a¯′, c¯3,
q′, and r3 such that the following holds for ∀k:
‖Ak‖ ≤ a¯′, ‖C3,k‖ ≤ c¯3, q′ ≤ Qk, r3I ≤ R3,k.
If Rank(Σ) 6= 0, there exist positive constants c¯1, g¯1, and
m¯1 such that the following holds for ∀k:
‖C1,k‖ ≤ c¯1, ‖G1,k‖ ≤ g¯1, ‖Σ−1‖ ≤ m¯1.
If Rank(Σ¯k) 6= 0, there exist positive constants c¯2, g2,
g¯2, m2, m¯2, and r2 such that the following holds for ∀k:
‖C2,k‖ ≤ c¯2, g2 ≤ ‖G2,k‖ ≤ g¯2,m2 ≤ ‖Σ¯
−1
k ‖ ≤ m¯2,
r2I ≤ R2,k.
Assumption 5.3 For any φ, ψ1 , ψ2 , ψ3 > 0, there
exists δ > 0 such that
‖φk‖ ≤ φ‖xk − xˆk|k‖2, ‖ψ1,k‖ ≤ ψ1‖xk − xˆk|k‖2
‖ψ2,k‖ ≤ ψ2‖xk − xˆk|k‖2, ‖ψ3,k‖ ≤ ψ3‖xk − xˆk|k‖2
hold for all ‖xk − xˆk|k‖ ≤ δ and k ≥ 0. For any ρ > 0,
there exists δρ > 0 such that ‖ρk‖ ≤ 2ρ for all  ≤ δρ
and k ≥ 0, where ρk is defined in (5).
Assumption 5.4 There exist positive constants p and
p¯ such that pI ≤ P xk ≤ p¯I for ∀k.
Under the assumptions, we can guarantee PESp-like
properties for the estimation errors of states and attack
vectors.
Theorem 5.1 Consider the NISE, provided that As-
sumptions 4.1, 5.1, 5.2, 5.3, and 5.4 hold. For any γ ∈
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(0, 1), there exist positive constants αx, αd1 , αd2 , bx, bd1 ,
bd2 , cx, cd1 , cd2 , δ, q¯
′, r¯1, r¯2, r¯3, and ¯ such that, if
Qk ≤ q¯′I, R1,k ≤ r¯1I, R2,k ≤ r¯2I, R3,k ≤ r¯3I, and
 ≤ ¯, then the following properties hold:
P (‖x˜k|k‖ < αxe−bxk‖x˜0|0‖+ cx) ≥ 1− γ,
P (‖d˜1(t)‖ < αd1e−bd1 t‖x˜0|0‖+ cd1) ≥ 1− γ,
P (‖d˜2(t)‖ < αd2e−bd2 t‖x˜0|0‖+ cd2) ≥ 1− γ
for all ‖x˜0|0‖ ≤ δ, k ≥ 0 and t ≥ 0.
Theorem 5.1 is formally proven in Section 8.3.2. A suf-
ficient condition for Assumptions 5.2 is that functions
f and h satisfy bi-Lipscitz continuity (p.10 in [27]), and
covariance matrices of noise vectors w′k and v
′
k are uni-
formly lower bounded by positive definite matrices. As-
sumptions 5.3 can be verified by checking if functions
f and h in system (4) satisfy Holder continuity (p.136
in [34]) with exponent 2. One sufficient condition for
Assumption 5.4 is the uniform observability of the pair
(C3,k, A¯k), as shown in Lemma 5.1. We recall that C3,k
and A¯k are defined in (8) and (11).
Lemma 5.1 Consider the NISE. Under Assump-
tions 4.1, 5.2, and 5.3, if the pair (C3,k, A¯k) is uniformly
observable and P x0 ≥ 0, then there exist positive con-
stants p and p¯ such that pI ≤ P xk ≤ p¯I for all k ≥ 0.
Lemma 5.1 is formally proven in Section 8.3.3.
Lemma 5.1 does not require Assumption 5.1 because
the update rule of error covariance matrices depend
only on known system matrices and covariance matrices
of noises.
Remark 5.1 Corresponding parameters for PESp-like
properties in Theorem 5.1 can be obtained in the proof.
For ease of presentation, we omit the procedure to find
these parameters. 
6 Discussion: Reducing mode number
When there are s+m signal attack locations, mode set
MA includes all the combinations of the attack loca-
tions; i.e., |MA| = 2s+m. As the number of signal attack
location increases, computational complexity increases
exponentially. We, in this section, discuss how to alle-
viate computational complexity by reducing the num-
ber of modes induced by MA, and how to estimate the
true mode from the estimation results of a reduced mode
set for hidden-mode switched linear systems. Finding
a reduced mode set presented in Section 6.1, and find-
ing a true mode presented in Section 6.2 are both on-
line procedures. The former is conducted before run-
ning the NISE, and the latter will replace the hypothe-
sis test (line 13-17) in the NISME. The complete algo-
rithm for the NISME with reduced mode set is presented
in Section 6.2, where we consider the special case with
|MI | = 1. In Section 6.3, we extend the results to any
MI .
Let us consider the special case where the dynamic for
each mode j is linear and switching, and |MI | = 1:
x˙(t) = A(t)x(t) +B(t)(u(t) + Sj(t)d(t)) + w(t),
x(t) ∈ Cj(t)
(x(t),j(t))+ = Ω(x(t), j(t)), x(t) ∈ Dj(t)
yk = Ckxk +Dkuk +H
jkdk + vk (13)
where Sj(t), and Hjk are defined in (4). We remind
Kj = [(Sj)T , (Hj)T ]T , and define Kj1 , {i = 1, · · · , n+
m|Kj(i, i) = 1}.
6.1 Mode reduction
Mode reduction is based on the following two ideas.
Firstly, we maintain the modes such that uniform
observability over finite time-horizon [c1, c2] (Defini-
tion 6.1) holds. Secondly, we remove modes whose as-
sumptions on attack locations are strictly restrictive
than those of others.
Definition 6.1 The pair (Ck, Ak) is uniformly observ-
able over [c1, c2] if and only if there exist positive con-
stants a, b, and l < c2 − c1 such that aI ≤ Mk+l,k ≤ bI
for k = c1, c1 + 1, · · · , c2 − l.
The first idea is motivated by the sufficient condition for
Lemma 5.1; uniform observability. To check uniform ob-
servability, the defender is required to have information
on pairs (Cj3,k, A¯
j
k) for k = 0, 1, · · · . This information is
hard to gather at initial time. We instead adopt an ap-
proximation, Definition 6.1, which only requires the sys-
tem matrices for a few next steps. Uniform observability
over [c1, c2] reduces to uniform observability as c2 →∞
with fixed c1.
To justify the second idea, consider a pair of modes j, j′ ∈
MA such that Kj
′
1 ⊂ Kj1, and (Cj3,k, A¯jk), (Cj
′
3,k, A¯
j′
k ) are
uniformly observable over [c1, c2]. The relation Kj
′
1 ⊂
Kj1 indicates that mode j′ imposes a more restrictive
assumption on attack locations than mode j. In this
sense, mode j′ is said to be redundant and it could be
ruled out to reduce computational complexity.
Intuitively speaking, the above ideas allow the minimal
number of modes to provide the same attack capabil-
ity as the power set. The reduced mode set is defined
by Md[c1,c2] = {j ∈ Mob[c1,c2]|@j′ ∈ Mob[c1,c2] s.t. K
j
1 ⊂ Kj
′
1 }
where Mob[c1,c2] , {j ∈ MA|(C
j
3,k, A¯
j
k) is uniformly ob-
servable over [c1, c2]}. It can be found by Algorithm 3
where MAi , {j ∈ MA||Kj1| = i}. Without the mode
reduction, the worst upper bound of |MA| is 2s+m, but
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Md[c1,c2] could be as low as 1 (see case study 2). It is
worthy to emphasize that the defender needs to know
(Cj3,k, A¯
j
k) over [c1, c2] in order to verify uniform observ-
ability in the interval.
Algorithm 3 Mode reduction (finding Md[c1,c2]).
Input: MA, Ak, Ck for k = c1, c1 + 1, · · · , c2 (or corre-
sponding A(t), C(t)), Gj , Hj for ∀j ∈MA;
1: Md[c1,c2] = ∅;
2: for i = s+m : 1 do
3: for j ∈MAi do
4: if (Cj3,k, A¯
j
k) is uniformly observable over
[c1, c2], and @j′ ∈Md[c1,c2] s.t. K
j
1 ⊂ Kj
′
1 then
5: Md[c1,c2] = M
d
[c1,c2]
∪ {j};
6: end if
7: end for
8: end for
Return: Md[c1,c2].
Remark 6.1 Mode reduction Algorithm 3 is not appli-
cable to nonlinear systems because uniform observability
is determined by where linearization is performed. This
information cannot be obtained in advance. 
6.2 True mode estimation
We discuss how to estimate the true mode from the out-
puts of the NISME under the reduced mode set. It might
be noticed that the reduced mode set might not include
true modes, since some of the modes are removed. Given
mode estimate jˆ(t) from the reduced mode set Md[c1,c2],
the idea is to conduct two-tailed z-test [29] for each at-
tack location i ∈ Kjˆ(t)1 to determine whether the attack
size is statistically significant. To be specific, we test the
null hypothesis that ith elements of d1,k or d2,k−1 are
zero:
H0 : d1,k(i− s) = 0 if i > s, H0 : d2,k−1(i) = 0 if i ≤ s
and dˆjˆk1,k(i−s) or dˆjˆk2,k−1(i) are regarded as samples. If the
null hypothesis is rejected, then we accept alternative
hypothesis
H1 : d1,k(i− s) 6= 0 if i > s, H1 : d2,k−1(i) 6= 0 if i ≤ s
i.e., there exists an attack on ith location. Algorithm 4
presents the pseudo code for true mode estimation. z-
value is presented as z(α) where α is the significance
level. Hypothesis tests are conducted in lines 6 and 13
for actuator attacks, and sensor attacks, respectively.
6.3 NISME with reduced mode set
Algorithm 5 shows the NISME with reduced mode sets.
The core of the algorithm is identical to that of the
NISME, and some differences are explained as follows.
We apply the mode reduction technique and true mode
estimation technique to each i ∈MI . The algorithm cal-
culates reduced mode set every T steps for every i ∈MI
(line 4). This requires the defender to have knowledge
on system matices for next T − 1 steps. Based on the
fact that the reduced mode set might not include the
true mode, we test attack vectors element-wise to iden-
tify the true mode (line 19). As T decreases in Algo-
rithm 5, lesser knowledge on system matrices is required,
but computational complexity induced by Algorithm 3
increases. When system (13) is time-invariant, T =∞.
Algorithm 4 Mode estimation with mode reduction
Input: jˆk, dˆ
jˆk
1,k, dˆ
jˆk
2,k−1, P
d1,jˆk
k , P
d2,jˆk
k−1 , α1, α2 (signifi-
cance levels);
1: Obtain z-values z(α1) and z(α2) from z-test table;
2: K jˆ
true
k = 0(s+m)×(s+m);
3: l1 = l2 = 1;
4: for i ∈ Kjˆk1 do
5: if i ≤ s then
6: if
|dˆjˆk
2,k−1(l2)|√
P
d2,jˆk
k−1 (l2,l2)
> z(α2) then
7: K jˆ
true
k (i, i) = 1, dˆ
jˆtruek
2,k−1(l2) = dˆ
jˆk
2,k−1(l2);
8: else
9: dˆ
jˆturek
2,k−1(l2) = 0;
10: end if
11: l2 = l2 + 1;
12: else
13: if
|dˆjˆk
1,k
(l1)|√
P
d1,jˆk
k
(l1,l1
> z(α1) then
14: K jˆ
true
k (i, i) = 1, dˆ
jˆtruek
1,k (l1) = dˆ
jˆk
1,k(l1);
15: else
16: dˆ
jˆtruek
1,k (l1) = 0;
17: end if
18: l1 = l1 + 1;
19: end if
20: end for
21: Obtain jˆtruek for corresponding K
jˆtruek ;
Return: jˆtruek , dˆ
jˆturek
1,k , dˆ
jˆturek
2,k−1.
7 Numerical simulation
In Section 5, a set of properties is shown for the true
mode under the time-invariant hidden mode. However,
we do not have formal guarantees for the cases of time-
varying modes. Moreover, the effectiveness of a set of
reduced modes discussed in Section 6 remains unclear.
In this section, we will use the IEEE 68-bus test system
to empirically illustrate them. The NISME is applied to
the IEEE 68-bus test system shown in Figure 3. In the
network, there are 16 generator buses (|G| = 16), and 52
load buses (|L| = 52). Each local bus is described by (1)
(as [16]), and (2) with  = 0.01s. It is assumed that noises
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Algorithm 5 NISME with reduced mode set
Input: xˆj0|0 = E[x0], P
x,j
0 = P0, µ
j
0 =
1
|M| , dˆ
j
1,0 =
(Σj)−1(zj1,0 − T j1,0h(xˆj0|0, u0, 0, j, 0)) for ∀j ∈ M;
Choose 0 < δ  1|M| , 0 < α1 < 1, 0 < α2 < 1 (sig-
nificance levels), and T ;
1: for q = 0 : N do
2: c1 = 1 + qT , c2 = (q + 1)T , MD[c1,c2] = ∅;
3: for i ∈MI do
4: Run Algorithm 3 with (MA, Aik, Cik for k =
c1, c1+1, · · · , c2,Gj ,Hj for ∀j ∈MA) to obtain
Md,i[c1,c2];
5: MD[c1,c2] = M
D
[c1,c2]
∪Md,i[c1,c2];
6: end for
7: for k = c1 : c2 do
8: Read sensor output yk, and control input u(t)
for t ∈ [tk−1, tk];
9: for j ∈MD[c1,c2] do
10: Run the NISE with input (j, xˆjk−1|k−1, dˆ
j
1,k−1,
P x,jk−1, P
d1,j
k−1 , P
xd1,j
k−1 , yk, u(t) for t ∈ [tk−1, tk])
to generate output (xˆjk|k, dˆ
j
1,k, dˆ
j
2,k−1, P
x,j
k ,
P d2,jk−1 , P
d1,j
k , P
xd1,j
k , N jk );
11: end for
.Mode estimator
12: for j ∈MD[c1,c2] do
13: µ¯jk = max{
N j
k
µj
k−1∑|MD
[c1,c2]
|
i=1
N i
k
µi
k−1
, δ};
14: end for
15: for j ∈MD[c1,c2] do
16: µjk =
µ¯j
k∑|MD
[c1,c2]
|
i=1
µ¯i
k
;
17: end for
18: Set jˆk = argmaxj µ
j
k;
19: Run Algorithm 4 with (jˆk, dˆ
jˆk
1,k, dˆ
jˆk
2,k−1, P
d1,jˆk
k ,
P d2,jˆkk−1 , α1, α2) to obtain (jˆ
true
k , dˆ
jˆturek
1,k , dˆ
jˆturek
2,k−1);
20: Return:
jˆ(t) = jˆtruek for t ∈ (tk−1, tk],
xˆ(t) = xˆjˆkk|k, t ∈ (tk−1, tk],
dˆ1(t) = dˆ
jˆturek
1,k for t ∈ [tk, tk+1),
dˆ2(t) = dˆ
jˆturek
2,k−1 for t ∈ (tk−1, tk].
21: end for
22: end for
w(t) and vk are zero mean Gaussian with covariance ma-
trices Qi(t) = 0.01
2I, and Ri,k = 0.01
4I. The param-
eters are adopted from page 598 in [23]: Di = 1, and
tij = 1.5 for ∀i ∈ V. Angular momentums are mi = 10s
for i ∈ G and a larger value mi = 100s for load buses
i ∈ L. Backstepping inspired stabilizing distributed con-
trollers [19] are applied to the power system. We choose
δ = 3.3% as a lower bound of probabilities.
Fig. 3. Locations of the attacks (Figure from [41]).
The attacker could launch 3 sensor attacks, 3 actuator
attacks, and 2 switching attacks described in Figure 3.
We consider the attack scenario where the sys-
tem is under the time-varying attacks: sensor at-
tacks 0.01 cos(0.12t) for t = [0, 10), actuator attacks
0.1 − 0.6 sin(0.3t) for t = [10, 20), and switching at-
tacks for t = [20, 30). For t ≥ 30, the system would be
attack-free.
The goals of case study 1 and 2 are to verify the per-
formance of the NISME for time-varying modes with a
regular mode set, and a reduced mode set, respectively.
Case study 1: Consider the following four modes.
Mode 0: Attack-free.
Mode 1: Sensors (electrical power outputs) 26, 53 and 54
are attacked.
Mode 2: Actuators 14, 15, and 16 are attacked.
Mode 3: Line switches {56, 57}, and {59, 60} are at-
tacked.
If the sizes of the estimated attack vectors are not sta-
tistically significant, mode 0 will be chosen, as described
in Algorithm 2.
Remark 7.1 The power system under the mode 1,2 and
3 satisfies Assumptions 4.1, 5.1, 5.2, 5.3 and uniform
observability condition for all three modes. This is because
the system is time invariant and the linearization error
is O(‖x˜k|k‖2) for ‖x˜k|k‖ ≤ 1. 
Significance levels α1 = α2 = 0.75 are applied with cor-
responding chi-square values χ23(0.75) = 4.11. The mode
probabilities and estimation results are shown in Fig-
ure 4 where the estimates are coincident with the true
modes. Mode estimation is inaccurate near 10 sec. This
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is because the sizes of attack vectors are small (the sec-
ond and third subfigure in Figure 5) during this time and
thus the attack vector estimates are not considered sta-
tistically significant. Mode probabilities of mode 1 and
2 are oscillating for t > 30, because both modes 1 and
2 with zero attack vectors would represent attack-free
mode (mode 0).
The outputs of the NISME and the real attack signals
are presented in Figure 5. The first subfigure indicates
that the state estimation errors satisfy PESp-like prop-
erty. Although the frequency fluctuates due to the actu-
ator attack t ∈ [10, 20), its estimates are accurate. The
additive sinusoidal sensor attack for t ∈ [0, 10) is well
estimated as shown in the second subfigure. The third
subfigure shows the estimates and real vectors of actua-
tor attack; the sinusoidal actuator attacks for t ∈ [10, 20)
on the control inputs. Around 10 sec, attack vector es-
timates are set to zero because dˆj=2a,14 is not considered
statistically significant.
Fig. 4. Mode estimates and probabilities of each mode.
Case study 2: There are 6 potential signal attack lo-
cations with 2 possible switching attacks, and thus we
have |MI | = 22, |MA| = 26, and |M| = 26 × 22 = 256.
We, however, could reduce the number of modes by
lines 3-6 in Algorithm 5 with T = ∞ into four; i.e.,
MD[1,∞] = {j1, j2, j3, j4}, where each mode associates
with one j ∈ MI . All the four modes assume that sen-
sors (electrical power outputs) 26, 53, 54 and actuators
14, 15, and 16 are attacked. Their assumptions on line
switching attacks are described as below:
Mode j1: There is no line switching attack.
Mode j2: Line switch {59, 60} is attacked.
Mode j3: Line switch {56, 57} is attacked.
Mode j4: Line switches {56, 57}, and {59, 60} are at-
tacked.
Fig. 5. Real signals and estimated signals (top to bottom);
(a) state estimation of angular frequency at bus 16; (b) sensor
attack estimation of bus 53; (c) actuator attack estimation
on the control input of bus 14.
Note that the systems under the new modes satisfy As-
sumptions 4.1, 5.2, 5.3 and uniform observability con-
dition as well as the rest of the assumptions in Theo-
rem 5.1. True mode estimation is essential because none
of the above modes is true.
We conduct the simulation for Algorithm 5, using confi-
dence levels α1 = α2 = 0.8 with corresponding z-values
z(α1) = z(α2) = 1.28. As case 1, the true modes are
among modes 0 to 3, defined in case 1. This is unknown
to the defender and the defender remains to consider
256 possible modes in Algorithm 4. For the presentation
purpose, we project the modes other than modes 0 to 3
into mode 4; i.e., if mode 4 is chosen, mode estimation
is incorrect.
The estimation results are shown in Figure 6, and 7,
which are consistent with the results of the case 1 shown
in Figure 4, and 5. The first subfigure in Figure 6 provides
a true mode estimation described in Section 6. As case
1, mode estimates are erroneous near 10 sec because
the sizes of attack vectors are small and thus the attack
vectors are not regarded statistically significant. After
30 sec, mode probabilities oscillate between two modes
in case study 1, but not in case study 2. In case study
1, two modes 1 and 2 are true with zero signal attacks,
but mode 3 cannot be a true mode. In case study 2, only
mode j1 is true with zero signal attacks, but modes j2,
j3 or j4 cannot be a true mode.
The modes in the reduced mode set have less restric-
tive assumptions on attack locations than those of the
original mode set, but shows similar estimation results.
This simulation, thus, validates the performance of the
NISME for the minimal number of modes discussed in
Section 6.
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Fig. 6. Mode estimates and probabilities of each mode with
reduced mode set.
Fig. 7. Performance of the NUISE for the reduced mode set.
Detailed descriptions on the other subfigures are identical to
those of Figure 5.
8 Estimator derivation and proofs
Section 8.1 and 8.2 derive the NISE and and mode es-
timator, respectively. The proofs of Theorem 5.1 and
Lemma 5.1 are detailed in Section 8.3.
8.1 Derivation of the NISE
We derive the NISE in this section. Since each NISE
works only for the corresponding fixed mode, we omit
the mode index j(t) for notational simplicity. To esti-
mate attack vectors and states, we leverage the discrep-
ancies between outputs z1,k, z2,k, and z3,k defined in (9),
and predicted outputs. We consider linearization error
terms (12) in order to establish exact equality, but they
would not be considered for the purpose of estimations
and covariance updates since they are unknown. As men-
tioned before, we derive the NISE by approximating that
the attack vector estimates are constants during a sam-
pling period. We denote x˜k|k,p, x˜k|k−1,p, d˜1,k,p, and d˜2,k,p
as estimation errors when the approximation is correct.
Additional errors caused by the approximation will be
considered in the stability analysis in Section 8.3.
The following lemma guarantees that the derivation
steps presented in this section are well defined.
Lemma 8.1 If P x0 is positive semidefinite, then,
for all k ≥ 1, P xk|k−1 is positive semidefinite, and
the following matrices induced by the NISE are
positive definite: P¯k|k−1 = C3,kP xk|k−1C
T
3,k + R3,k,
R˜1,k , C1,kP xk CT1,k + R1,k (if Rank(Σ) 6= 0), and
R˜2,k , C2,k(I + Ak−1 − G1,k−1M1C1,k−1)P xk−1(I +
Ak−1 − G1,k−1M1C1,k−1)TCT2,k + 2C2,kG1,k−1
M1R1,k−1MT1 G
T
1,k−1C
T
2,k + 
2C2,kQk−1CT2,k + R2,k (if
Rank(Σ¯k) 6= 0).
PROOF. We first prove that P xk−1 ≥ 0, and P xk|k−1 ≥ 0
for k ≥ 1 by induction. Since P x0 ≥ 0, P x1|0 ≥ 0 in line
5 of the NISE. Assume P xk−1 ≥ 0, and P xk|k−1 ≥ 0, then
Lk is well defined since R3,k are positive definite. This
implies that P xk ≥ 0 in line 8 of the NISE, and P xk+1 ≥ 0
in line 5 of the NISE. By induction, we conclude that
P xk−1 ≥ 0, and P xk|k−1 ≥ 0 for k ≥ 1.
Pick any k ≥ 1, reminding that P xk ≥ 0 and P xk|k−1 ≥ 0.
It holds that P¯k|k−1, R˜1,k, and R˜2,k are positive definite
because R1,k (if Rank(Σ) 6= 0), R2,k (if Rank(Σ¯k) 6= 0),
andR3,k are positive definite. Since the above statement
holds for any k ≥ 1, we complete the proof. 
8.1.1 Attack vector d1,k−1 estimation
Since attack vector d1,k−1 can be directly measured by
z1,k−1, it can be estimated by, given xˆk−1|k−1,
dˆ1,k−1 = M1(z1,k−1 − h1(xˆk−1|k−1, uk−1, 0, tk−1))
= M1(C1,k−1x˜k−1|k−1,p +H1d1,k−1 + v1,k−1 + ψ1,k−1)
(14)
where we linearize h1, considering linearization error
ψ1,k−1. Estimate dˆ1,k−1 is unbiased if M1H1 = I. By
normalizing the covariance matrix of the right hand side
of (14), we can apply Gauss Markov theorem to find
the optimal gain, where best linear unbiased estimate
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(BLUE) is the linear estimate with smallest variance
among all linear and unbiased estimates.
Theorem 8.1 (Gauss Markov Theorem [17]) Estimate
xˆ = (H∗H)−1H∗y is the BLUE for the model y = Hx+v
where v is a zero-mean random variable with unit vari-
ance and H has full column rank.
The BLUE gain can be obtained through Gauss Markov
theorem:
M1 = (H
T
1 R˜
−1
1,k−1H1)
−1HT1 R˜
−1
1,k−1 = H
−1
1
because R˜1,k−1 is nonsingular by Lemma 8.1 if
Rank(Σ) 6= 0. Error dynamics for d˜1,k−1,p is
d˜1,k−1,p = −M1(C1,k−1x˜k−1|k−1,p + v1,k−1 + ψ1,k−1).
(15)
8.1.2 Attack vector d2,k−1 estimation
Attack vector d2,k−1 can be estimated using the discrep-
ancy between the predicted output and the measured
output
dˆ2,k−1 = M2,k(z2,k − h2(uk, 0, tk)
− C2,k(xˆk−1|k−1 + f(xˆk−1|k−1, uk−1, dˆ1,k−1, 0, tk−1)))
= M2,k(C2,k(I + Ak−1)x˜k−1|k−1,p + C2,kρk−1
+ C2,kG1,k−1d˜1,k−1,p + C2,kG2,k−1d2,k−1
+ C2,kwk−1 + C2,kφk−1 + v2,k + ψ2,k) (16)
where we linearize functions h2 and f with consider-
ing linearization errors (12). Estimate dˆ2,k−1 is unbiased
if M2,kC2,kG2,k−1 = I. By Gauss Markov theorem,
BLUE gain M2,k can be found by
M2,k = (
2GT2,k−1C
T
2,kR˜
−1
2,kC2,kG2,k−1)
−1
× GT2,k−1CT2,kR˜−12,k = (C2,kG2,k−1)−1
because C2,kG2,k−1 = C2,kGk−1V2 = Σ¯k is nonsingular
and R˜−12,k is also nonsingular as shown in Lemma 8.1.
Estimation error is
d˜2,k−1,p = −M2,k(C2,k(I + Ak−1)x˜k−1|k−1,p
+ C2,kG1,k−1d˜1,k−1,p + C2,kwk−1 + C2,kφk−1 + v2,k
+ ψ2,k + C2,kρk−1). (17)
8.1.3 State prediction
Since we have the state and attack vector estimates of
the previous time instant, we can predict the current
state using the dynamic
˙ˆx(t) = f(xˆ(t), u(t), dˆ1,k−1, 0, t) +G2,k−1dˆ2,k−1 (18)
for t ∈ (tk−1, tk] with initial condition xˆk−1|k−1 to have
xˆk|k−1 at t = tk. Or equivalently,
xˆk|k−1 = xˆk−1|k−1 + f(xˆk−1|k−1, uk−1, dˆ1,k−1, 0, tk−1)
+ G2,k−1dˆ2,k−1 + ρk−1
where discretization error ρk−1 is considered to obtain
the equivalence of (18). Its error dynamic is obtained by
applying dynamics (10) to xk:
x˜k|k−1,p = xk − xˆk|k−1 = (I + Ak−1)x˜k−1|k−1,p
+ G1,k−1d˜1,k−1,p + G2,k−1d˜2,k−1,p + wk−1 + φk−1
(19)
where we linearize f and consider linearization error
φk−1. The corresponding error covariance matrix is ob-
tained by P xk|k−1 = A¯k−1P
x
k−1(A¯k−1)
T +Q¯k−1 where we
apply (15) and (17).
8.1.4 State estimation
We correct the predicted state estimation using the dif-
ference between the expected output and measured out-
put z3,k as
xˆk|k = xˆk|k−1 + Lk(z3,k − h3(xˆk|k−1, uk, 0, tk)) (20)
and its estimation error is
x˜k|k,p = (I − LkC3,k)x˜k|k−1,p − Lkv3,k − Lkψ3,k (21)
where we linearize h3 and consider linearization errors
ψ3,k. Its error covariance matrix is found by
P xk = (I − LkC3,k)P xk|k−1(I − LkC3,k)T + LkR3,kLTk .
Minimizing the error covariance tr(P xk ) with deci-
sion variable Lk is an unconstrained optimization
problem. To find the BLUE, we take tr(P xk ) deriva-
tive and set it equal to zero
∂ tr(Pxk )
∂Lk
= 2((Cj3,kP
x,j
k|k−1
(Cj3,k)
T + Rj3,k)L
T
k − C3,kP xk|k−1) = 0 where Lk =
P xk|k−1C
T
3,k(C
j
3,kP
x,j
k|k−1(C
j
3,k)
T +Rj3,k)
−1 is the solution
of the unconstrained optimization problem and Lk is
well defined because P x,jk|k−1 ≥ 0 (by Lemma 8.1), and
Rj3,k > 0.
Plugging (15), (17), and (19) into (21) yields the fol-
lowing update rule for the state estimation errors of the
NISE:
x˜k|k,p = A¯k−1x˜k−1|k−1,p + w¯k−1 + φ¯k−1 + ρ¯k−1
− Lk(C3,k(A¯k−1x˜k−1|k−1,p + w¯k−1 + φ¯k−1 + ρ¯k−1)
+ v3,k + ψ3,k) (22)
where A¯k−1 and w¯k−1 are defined in (11),
φ¯k−1 , (I − G2,k−1M2,kC2,k)
× (φk−1 −G1,k−1M1ψ1,k−1)− G2,k−1M2,kψ2,k
ρ¯k−1 , −G2,k−1M2,kC2,kρk−1.
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8.1.5 The priori probability of the mode
The priori probability of the mode is derived and ex-
plained in the following section.
8.2 Derivation of the mode estimator
It is natural that the predicted output must be matched
with the measured output if the mode j is the true mode.
For ∀j ∈ M, we quantify the discrepancy between the
predicted output and the measured output as follows
νjk = z
j
3,k − h3(xˆjk|k−1, uk, 0, j, tk).
We approximate the output error νjk as a multivariate
Gaussian random variable. Then, the likelihood function
is given by
N jk , P(yk|j = true) = N (νjk; 0, P¯ jk|k−1)
=
exp(−(νjk)T (P¯ jk|k−1)−1νjk/2)
(2pi)nj/2|P¯ jk|k−1|1/2
where P¯ jk|k−1 = C
j
3,kP
j
k|k−1(C
j
3,k)
T + Rj3,k is the error
covariance matrix of νjk and n
j = Rank(P¯ jk|k−1). The
likelihood function is well-defined since P¯ jk|k−1 > 0 as
shown in Lemma 8.1. By the Bayes’ theorem, the pos-
terior probabilities are µjk , P(j = true|yk, · · · , y0) =
P(yk|j=true)P(j=true|yk−1,··· ,y0)∑|M|
i=1
P(yk|i=true)P(i=true|yk−1,··· ,y0)
=
N j
k
µj
k−1∑|M|
i=1
N i
k
µi
k−1
.
However, such update might allow that some µjk con-
verge to zero. To prevent this, we modify the pos-
terior probability update to µjk =
µ¯j
k∑|M|
i=1
µ¯i
k
, where
µ¯jk = max{
N j
k
µj
k−1∑|M|
i=1
N i
k
µi
k−1
, δ} and δ > 0 is a pre-selected
small constant preventing the vanishment of the mode
probabilities. The last step is to generate the state, at-
tack vector, and mode estimates of the mode having the
maximum posteriori probability.
8.3 Stability analysis of the NISE
The piece-wise constant approximation of the attack vec-
tor estimates affects the state estimation error update
rule; i.e., (22) would be the exact expression only if the
approximation is correct. We first obtain the exact re-
lation between x˜k|k and x˜k−1|k−1, by analyzing the ap-
proximation errors.
Without loss of generality, if Rank(Σ) = 0 in Assump-
tion 5.2, consider constants c¯1 = g¯1 = m¯1 = 0 for this
section. Likewise, if Rank(Σ¯k) = 0 for ∀k, consider con-
stants c¯2 = g2 = g¯2 = m2 = m¯2 = r2 = 0 for this
section.
8.3.1 Approximation error analysis
Subscript e is adopted to express the additional error
induced by the piece-wise constant approximation; e.g.,
d˜1(t) = d1(t)− dˆ1,k = d˜1,k,p + d1,e(t) for t ∈ [tk, tk+1).
Under Assumption 5.1, the approximation errors for the
attack vector estimates, state estimates and state pre-
dictions are bounded.
Lemma 8.2 Consider the NISE. Given Assump-
tions 5.1, 5.2, and 5.4, the approximation errors for
the attack vector estimates, state estimates and state
predictions are bounded by
‖d1,e(t)‖ ≤ d¯, ‖d2,e(t)‖ ≤ d¯,
‖xe(t)‖ ≤ χ¯, ‖xk|k,e‖ ≤ (1 + l¯c¯3)χ¯
where χ¯ , Φ¯( 12 g¯1 + g¯2)d¯2, l¯ , p¯c¯3r3,
Φ¯ , supk supt,τ∈[tk,tk+1) ‖Φ(t, τ)‖ and state transition
matrix Φ(t, τ) = e
∫ t
τ
A(σ)dσ
.
PROOF. We prove bounds for d1,e(t) and d2,e(t). Note
that d1,e(t) and d2,e(t) satisfy ‖d1,e(tk)‖ = ‖d2,e(tk)‖ =
0 for ∀k after a new estimate is made at the sampling
instants. Therefore, we consider their bounds during the
one sampling time interval only. Its bound can be found
by
‖d1,e(t1)‖ ≤ (t1 − tk) sup
t∈[tk,tk+1)
‖d(t)− d(tk)
t− tk ‖ ≤ d¯
where t1 − tk ≤  is applied to get the desired result.
The proof for d2(t2) is analogous to that of d1(t1). The
approximation errors for the attack vector estimates in-
duce additional errors for the state predictions.
We proceed to prove bounds for xe(t). Consider the con-
tinuous time state prediction error
˙˜x(t) = f(x(t), u(t), d1(t), w
′(t), t) +G2(t)d2(t)
− f(xˆ(t), u(t), dˆ1,k, 0, t)−G2(t)dˆ2,k
= A(t)(x˜p(t) + xe(t)) +G1(t)(d˜1,k + d1,e(t))
+G2(t)(d˜2,k + d2,e(t)) + w(t) + φ(t)
where x˜p(t) represents the state prediction error by
prediction (18) when the approximation is correct, and
xe(t) = 0 if the approximation is correct. Therefore, we
consider the bound during the one sampling interval
and it holds that
x˙e(t) = A(t)xe(t) +G1(t)d1,e(t) +G2(t)d2,e(t).
For t ∈ [tk, tk+1], its solution is
xe(t) =
∫ tk+1
tk
Φ(t, τ)(G1(τ)d1,e(τ) +G2(τ)d2,e(τ))dτ.
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Its bound can be found by, taking norm both sides,
‖xe(t)‖ ≤
∫ t
tk
Φ¯(g¯1(τ − tk)d¯+ g¯2(tk+1 − τ)d¯ dτ
= Φ¯(
1
2
g¯1d¯(t− tk) + 1
2
g¯2d¯(tk+1 − t) + 1
2
g¯2d¯)(t− tk).
We can obtain the desired result by applying tk+1− t ≤
 and t − tk ≤ . From the result, we can derive the
approximation error for the state estimations xk|k,e.
Consider the state estimation error
x˜k|k,p + xk|k,e = x˜k|k = xk − xˆk|k
= x˜k|k−1,p + xe(tk)− Lk(C3,k(x˜k|k−1,p + xe(tk))
+ v3,k + ψ3,k) (23)
where (20) is applied to the third equality. Subtracting
x˜k|k,p in (22) both sides, we have
xk|k,e = xe(tk)− LkC3,kxe(tk). (24)
By taking the norm both sides and apply Cauchy-
Schwarz inequality, its upper bound can be found by
‖x˜k|k,e‖ ≤ (1 + l¯c¯3)χ¯. 
8.3.2 Proof of Theorem 5.1
We define Lyapunov candidate Vk , x˜Tk|k(P xk )−1x˜k|k
with 0 < pI ≤ P xk ≤ p¯I. Plugging (22) and (24) into the
update rule of x˜k|k in (23), we obtain
Vk = x˜
T
k−1|k−1A¯
T
k−1(I − LkC3,k)T (P xk )−1(I − LkC3,k)
× A¯k−1x˜k−1|k−1 + v¯Tk (P xk )−1
× (2(I − LkC3,k)(A¯k−1x˜k−1|k−1 + xe(tk)) + v¯k + 2ψ¯k)
+ ψ¯Tk (P
x
k )
−1(2(I − LkC3,k)A¯k−1x˜k−1|k−1 + ψ¯k)
+ xTe (tk)(I − LkC3,k)T (P xk )−1
× ((I − LkC3,k)(2A¯k−1x˜k−1|k−1 + xe(tk)) + 2ψ¯k)
(25)
where ψ¯k , (I − LkC3,k)(φ¯k−1 + ρ¯k−1) − Lkψ3,k and
v¯k , (I−LkC3,k)w¯k−1−Lkv3,k. To deal with the above
terms, we formalize the proof by several claim state-
ments; i.e., Claim B.1-B.4 deal with the first to fourth
terms in (25), respectively.
Recall that Qk ≤ q¯′I, R1,k ≤ r¯1, R2,k ≤ r¯2, R3,k ≤
r¯3, and  ≤ ¯ for some constants q¯′, r¯1, r¯2, r¯3, and ¯.
We will show that, for any γ ∈ (0, 1), if q¯′, r¯1, r¯2, r¯3,
and ¯ are chosen properly, then the state estimation er-
rors x˜k|k and attack vector estimation errors d˜1(t), d˜2(t)
hold PESp-like properties. Assumption 5.2 implies that
‖A¯k‖ ≤ a¯ , (1 + g¯2c¯2m¯2)(1 + a¯′ + g¯1c¯1m¯1), and
qI ≤ Q¯k ≤ q¯I where q , max{2g22m22r2, 2q′} and
q¯ , 2(1 + g¯2c¯2m¯2)2(q¯′ + g¯1m¯1r¯1)2 + 2g¯22m¯22r¯2.
Claim B.1: There exists a constant α′ = (1+
q
2a¯2p¯ )
−1 ∈
(0, 1) such that
A¯Tk−1(I − LkC3,k)T (P xk )−1(I − LkC3,k)A¯k−1
< α′(P xk−1)
−1.
PROOF. Error covariance matrix is updated as
P xk = (I − LkC3,k)A¯k−1P xk−1A¯Tk−1(I − LkC3,k)T
+ (I − LkC3,k)Q¯k−1(I − LkC3,k)T + LkR3,kLTk .
From the upper and lower bounds of matrices, we have
P xk > (I − LkC3,k)A¯k−1P xk−1A¯Tk−1(I − LkC3,k)T
× (1 + q
2a¯2p¯
) + LkR3,kL
T
k .
This implies that P xk − (I −LkC3,k)A¯k−1P xk−1A¯Tk−1(I −
LkC3,k)
T (1 +
q
2a¯2p¯ ) > 0 and thus it holds that
(1 +
q
2a¯2p¯
)P xk−1 + (1 +
q
2a¯2p¯
)P xk−1A¯
T
k−1(I − LkC3,k)T
× (P xk − (I − LkC3,k)A¯k−1P xk−1A¯Tk−1(I − LkC3,k)T )
> 0.
By applying the matrix inversion lemma [10], it follows
that
((1 +
q
2a¯2p¯
)−1(P xk−1)
−1 − A¯Tk−1(I − LkC3,k)T (P xk )−1
× (I − LkC3,k)A¯k−1)−1 > 0
which implies the statement with α′ = (1 +
q
2a¯2p¯ )
−1. 
Claim B.2: There exists a positive constant 0 > 0 such
that
E[v¯Tk (P xk )−1(2(I − LkC3,k)(A¯k−1x˜k−1|k−1 + xe(tk))
+ v¯k + 2ψ¯k)] ≤ 0.
PROOF. Noises wk−1, v1,k−1, v2,k, and v3,k are uncor-
related and thus we have
E[v¯Tk (P xk )−1(2(I − LkC3,k)(A¯k−1x˜k−1|k−1 + xe(tk))
+ v¯k + 2ψ¯k)]
= E[v¯Tk (P xk )−1v¯k] ≤ 2p(1 + l¯c¯3)2((1 + g¯2m¯2c¯2)2
× (q¯Rank(Qk−1) + g¯21m¯21r¯1Rank(R1,k−1))
+ g¯22m¯
2
2r¯2Rank(R2,k)) + pl¯
2r¯3Rank(R3,k) , 0
where we apply ‖v1,k‖2 = tr(vT1,kv1,k) = tr(v1,kvT1,k) ≤
r¯1Rank(R1,k) and the similar relations for ‖wk−1‖2,
‖v2,k‖2, and ‖v3,k‖2. 
Claim B.3: There exist constants δ, δρ, λ1, 1 > 0 such
that, for ∀‖x˜k−1|k−1‖ ≤ δ and  ≤ δρ, the following
holds:
ψ¯Tk (P
x
k )
−1(2(I − LkC3,k)A¯k−1x˜k−1|k−1 + ψ¯k)
≤ λ1‖x˜k−1|k−1‖3 + 1.
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PROOF. By Assumptions 5.2 and 5.3, it holds that
‖ψ¯k‖ = ‖(I − LkC3,k)(φ¯k−1 + ρ¯k−1)− Lkψ3,k‖
≤ (1 + l¯c¯3)((1 + g¯2c¯2m¯2)(φ + ψ1 g¯1m¯1) + g¯2m¯2ψ2)
× ‖x˜k−1|k−1‖2 + 2ρg¯2m¯2c¯2 + l¯ψ3‖x˜k−1|k−1‖2
, λ′1‖x˜k−1|k−1‖2 + ′1
for all ‖x˜k−1|k−1‖ ≤ δ, and  ≤ δρ. Therefore, we have
ψ¯Tk (P
x
k )
−1(2(I − LkC3,k)A¯k−1x˜k−1|k−1 + ψ¯k)
≤ 2λ′1p(1 + l¯c¯3)a¯‖x˜k−1|k−1‖3 + λ′21 pδ‖x˜k−1|k−1‖3
+ ′1p(2(1 + l¯c¯3)a¯δ + λ
′
1δ
2 + ′1)
, λ1‖x˜k−1|k−1‖3 + 1
where ‖x˜k−1|k−1‖ ≤ δ is applied. 
Claim B.4: There exist constants δ, λ2, 2 > 0 such
that, for ∀‖x˜k−1|k−1‖ ≤ δ, the following holds:
xTe (tk)(I − LkC3,k)T (P xk )−1((I − LkC3,k)(2A¯k−1
× x˜k−1|k−1 + xe(tk)) + 2ψ¯k) ≤ 2 + λ2‖x˜k−1|k−1‖3.
PROOF. By noting that ‖xe(tk)‖ ≤ χ¯, we have
xTe (tk)(I − LkC3,k)T (P xk )−1((I − LkC3,k)
× (2A¯k−1x˜k−1|k−1 + xe(tk)) + 2ψ¯k)
≤ p(1 + l¯c¯3)((1 + l¯c¯3)(2a¯‖x˜k−1|k−1‖+ χ¯)
+ 2λ′1‖x˜k−1|k−1‖2 + 2′1)χ¯ ≤ 2 + λ2‖x˜k−1|k−1‖3
for any ‖x˜k−1|k−1‖ ≤ δ where 2 , p(1 + l¯c¯3)((1 +
l¯c¯3)(2a¯ + χ¯) + 2λ
′
1 + 2
′
1)χ¯ and λ2 , p(1 + l¯c¯3)(2(1 +
l¯c¯3)a¯+ 2λ
′
1)χ¯. 
By applying Claims B.1-B.4 to (25), we have
E[Vk] ≤ α′E[x˜Tk−1|k−1P−1k−1x˜k−1|k−1]
+ λE[‖x˜k−1|k−1‖3] + (0 + 1 + 2)
for ∀‖x˜k−1|k−1‖ ≤ δ and  ≤ δρ where λ , λ1 + λ2.
Note that λ1 tends to zero as φ, ψ1 , ψ2 , ψ3 , ρ tend to
zero; λ2 tends to zero as  = tk − tk−1 tends to zero.
By choosing a sufficiently small tuple (φ, ψ1 , ψ3 , ρ, ¯
′)
such that λδ < α′p¯−1, we have
E[Vk] ≤ αE[Vk−1] + c (26)
for ‖x˜k−1|k−1‖ ≤ δ where 0 < α < 1 and c , 0 +1 +2.
Inequality (26) holds for all  ≤ ¯′. Remind that 0 tends
to zero as q¯′, r¯1, r¯2 and r¯3 tend to zero, and constants 1
and 2 tend to zero as  tends to zero. Thus, for any given
constant c′ > 0, we can choose sufficiently small tuple
(q¯′, r¯1, r¯2, r¯3, ¯) such that c < c′ holds. The following
claim shows a PESp-like property for state estimation
errors.
Claim B.5: For any γ ∈ (0, 1), there exist positive con-
stants αx, bx, cx, δ and tuple (q¯
′, r¯1, r¯2, r¯3, ¯) such that,
for all ‖x˜0|0‖ ≤ δ, the following holds for all k ≥ 0:
P (‖x˜k|k‖ < αxe−bxk‖x˜0|0‖+ cx) ≥ 1− γ.
PROOF. Consider any γ ∈ (0, 1) and γ1 < γ. Then,
there exists sufficiently small constant δ < δ and tuple
(q¯′, r¯1, r¯2, r¯3, ¯) such that p¯δ2 + c1−α ≤ γ1pδ2 holds.
Since V ≤ p¯‖x˜‖2, we have
V +
c
1− α ≤ p¯‖x˜‖
2 +
c
1− α ≤ γ1pδ
2, ∀‖x˜‖ ≤ δ. (27)
We choose any ‖x˜0|0‖ ≤ δ. Define the first exit time
µ , inf{tk > 0|‖x˜k|k‖ > δ}, and µ ∧ k , min{µ, k} for
any k > 0. We have
pδ2P (µ ≤ k) = E[pδ2I[µ≤k]] ≤ E[VµI[µ≤k]]
≤ E[Vµ∧k] ≤ αµ∧kV0 + c
µ∧k−1∑
i=0
αi (28)
where indicator function I[µ≤k] satisfies I[µ≤k] = 1 if
µ ≤ k, otherwise I[µ≤k] = 0. The first inequality holds
because pδ2 < p‖x˜µ|µ‖2 ≤ Vµ. The third inequality is
derived by recursively applying E[Vk] ≤ αE[Vk−1] + c.
By (27), it follows from (28) that
P (µ ≤ k) ≤ γ1α
µ∧kV0 + c
∑µ∧k−1
i=0 α
i
V0 +
c
1−α
≤ γ1. (29)
Letting k →∞, we also have
P (‖x˜k|k‖ ≤ δ) ≥ 1− γ1.
Again consider any k with µ ∧ k, and γ2 = γ − γ1.
Markov’s inequality (p.455 [12]) derives
P (Vµ∧k ≥
αµ∧kV0 + c1−α
γ2
) ≤ γ2 E[Vµ∧k]
αµ∧kV0 + c1−α
≤ γ2α
µ∧kV0 + c
∑µ∧k−1
i=0 α
i
αµ∧kV0 + c1−α
≤ γ2.
Equivalently, P (Vµ∧k <
αµ∧kV0+ c1−α
γ2
) ≥ 1 − γ2. This
implies that, by Minkowski inequality,
P (‖x˜µ∧k|µ∧k‖ <
√
p¯
γ2p
α(µ∧k)/2‖x˜0|0‖+
√
c
(1− α)(pγ2) )
= P (‖x˜µ∧k|µ∧k‖ < βx(‖x˜0|0‖, µ ∧ k) + cx) ≥ 1− γ2
(30)
where βx(‖x˜0|0‖, µ∧k) =
√
p¯
γ2p
α(µ∧k)/2‖x˜0|0‖ and cx =√
c
(1−α)(pγ2) ). By (29) and (30), we can obtain
P (‖x˜k|k‖ < βx(‖x˜0|0‖, k) + cx)
= P (‖x˜k|k‖ < βx(‖x˜0|0‖, k) + cx|µ > k)P (µ > k)
+ P (‖x˜k|k‖ < βx(‖x˜0|0‖, k) + cx|µ ≤ k)P (µ ≤ k)
≥ P (‖x˜µ∧k|µ∧k‖ < βx(‖x˜0|0‖, µ ∧ k) + cx|µ > k)
× P (µ > k)
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= P (‖x˜µ∧k|µ∧k‖ < βx(‖x˜0|0‖, µ ∧ k) + cx)
− P (‖x˜µ∧k|µ∧k‖ < βx(‖x˜0|0‖, µ ∧ k) + cx|µ ≤ k)
× P (µ ≤ k)
≥ 1− γ2 − γ1 = 1− γ. (31)

We now proceed to prove PESp-like property of d˜1(t).
Without loss of generality, consider γ, γ1, and x˜0|0 used
in Claim B.5. Consider mean square errors of dˆ1(t) for
t ∈ [tk, tk+1), with equation (15) and ‖d1,e(t)‖ ≤ d¯ by
Lemma 8.2:
E[‖d˜1(µ ∧ t)‖2] = E[‖d˜1,µ∧k,p + d1,e(µ ∧ t)‖2]
≤ m¯21(E[c¯21‖x˜µ∧k|µ∧k,p‖2 + c¯1d¯‖x˜µ∧k|µ∧k,p‖
+ ‖v1,µ∧k‖2 + ‖ψ1,µ∧k‖2 + 2c¯1‖x˜µ∧k|µ∧k,p‖‖ψ1,µ∧k‖
+ d¯‖ψ1,µ∧k‖]) + 2d¯2
where we apply Cauchy-Schwarz inequality. Since
‖x˜µ∧k|µ∧k,p‖ ≤ ‖x˜µ∧k|µ∧k‖+‖xµ∧k|µ∧k,e‖ ≤ ‖x˜µ∧k|µ∧k‖
+(1 + l¯c¯2)χ¯ and ‖x˜µ∧k|µ∧k‖ ≤ δ, it follows that
E[‖d˜1(µ ∧ t)‖2] ≤ m¯21(c¯21 + 2ψ1 c¯1(δ + (1 + l¯c¯2)χ¯)
+ 2ψ1(δ
2 + d¯))E[x˜µ∧k|µ∧k] + m¯21(c¯21(δ(1 + l¯c¯2)χ¯
+ (1 + l¯c¯2)
2χ¯2) + c¯1d¯(δ + (1 + l¯c¯2)χ¯)
+ r¯1Rank(R1,µ∧k)) + 2d¯2
where ‖v1,µ∧k‖2 ≤ r¯1Rank(R1,µ∧k), and ‖ψ1,µ∧k‖ ≤
ψ1‖x˜µ∧k|µ∧k‖2 are applied. Applying  ≤ c and
E[‖x˜µ∧k|µ∧k‖2] ≤ α
µ∧k
p V0 +
c
p
∑µ∧k−1
i=0 α
i obtained
in (28), it follows that
E[‖d˜1(µ ∧ t)‖2] ≤ β1(‖x˜0|0‖2, µ ∧ k) + c1
where
β1(‖x˜0|0‖2, µ ∧ k) = m¯21(c¯21 + 2ψ1 c¯1(δ + (1 + l¯c¯2)χ¯)
+ 2ψ1(δ
2 + cd¯))
αµ∧k
p
p¯‖x˜0|0‖2,
c1 = m¯
2
1(c¯
2
1 + 2ψ1 c¯1(δ + (1 + l¯c¯2)χ¯) + 
2
ψ1(δ
2 + cd¯))
× c
p(1− α) + m¯
2
1(c¯
2
1(δ(1 + l¯c¯2)χ¯+ (1 + l¯c¯2)
2χ¯2)
+ c¯1cd¯(δ + (1 + l¯c¯2)χ¯) + r¯1Rank(R1,µ∧k)) + 2d¯2.
By Markov’s inequality, for t ∈ [tk, tk+1), we have
P (‖d˜1(µ ∧ t)‖2 ≥
β1(‖x˜0|0‖2, µ ∧ k) + c1
γ3
) ≤ γ3
for any γ3 ∈ (0, 1). Analogous to (31), we have the fol-
lowing for t ∈ [tk, tk+1)
P (‖d˜1(t)‖2 <
β1(‖x˜0|0‖2, k) + c1
γ3
)
≥ P (‖d˜1(µ ∧ t)‖2 <
β1(‖x˜0|0‖2, µ ∧ k) + c1
γ3
|µ > k)
× P (µ > k)
= P (‖d˜1(µ ∧ t)‖2 <
β1(‖x˜0|0‖2, µ ∧ k) + c1
γ3
)
− P (‖d˜1(µ ∧ t)‖2 <
β1(‖x˜0|0‖2, µ ∧ k) + c1
γ3
|µ ≤ k)
× P (µ ≤ k)
≥ 1− γ3 − γ1 ≥ γ
for some γ ∈ (0, 1). By applying Minkowski inequality to
β1(‖x˜0|0‖2,k)+c1
γ3
, we obtain PESp-like property for d˜1(t).
The proof of PESp-like property for d˜2(t) is similar to
that for d˜1(t). We omit its details. Thus, we complete
the proof. 
8.3.3 Proof of Lemma 5.1
To prove the statement, we first formally establish the
equivalence of the NISE and the extended Kalman filter
by expressing the attack vector estimates as functions
of state estimates. Due to such connection, we apply
existing results on the analysis of the extended Kalman
filer [8] to the NISE to prove the rest of the part.
By expressing d˜1,k−1,p and d˜2,k−1,p as functions of
x˜k−1|k−1,p, the state estimation error update of the
NISE can be found by (22). The estimation update rule
of (22) is identical to that of the following continuous-
discrete extended Kalman filtering problem
x˙(t) = f¯(x(t), u(t), w¯′(t), t)
z3,k = h¯(xk, uk, v
′
k, tk) (32)
where its linearized system is given by
xk+1 = xk + f¯(xk, uk, w¯
′
k, tk) + ρ¯k
' xk + (A¯kxk + B¯kuk + ρ¯k) + w¯k
z3,k ' C3,kxk +D3,kuk + v3,k
as shown in Claim C.1; i.e., the two problems are equiv-
alent to each other.
Claim C.1: Under Assumption 4.1, state and error co-
variance update rule of the continuous-discrete extended
Kalman filter problem (32) is identical to that described
in (22) for the system (4). Moreover, the optimal esti-
mate gains are identical.
PROOF. First consider (32). State prediction can be
˙ˆx(t) = f¯(xˆ(t), u(t), 0, t)
for t ∈ (tk−1, tk] to have xˆk|k−1 at t = tk. Or equivalently,
xˆk|k−1 = xˆk−1|k−1 +f¯(xˆk−1|k−1, uk−1, 0, tk−1)+ρ¯k−1.
Its error dynamic is given by, linearizing f ,
x˜k|k−1,p = (I + A¯k−1)x˜k−1|k−1,p + w¯k−1 + φ¯k−1.
State estimate is
xˆk|k = xˆk|k−1 + Lk(z3,k − h¯(xk|k−1, uk, 0, tk))
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with its error dynamic
x˜k|k,p = (I − LkC3,k)x˜k|k−1,p − Lkv3,k − Lkψ3,k
= A¯k−1x˜k−1|k−1,p + w¯k−1 + φ¯k−1 + ρ¯k−1
− Lk(C3,k(A¯x˜k−1|k−1,p + w¯k−1 + φ¯k−1 + ρ¯k−1) + v3,k
+ ψ3,k).
which is identical to (22). Once the state update rule (22)
is obtained, then error covariance update can be found
by the same argument for the NISE. Moreover, it should
be emphasized that we need to solve the same uncon-
strained optimization problem to find the optimal gains
Lk for the both extended Kalman filer and NISE. 
Assumption 5.2 implies that ‖A¯k‖ ≤ a¯, qI ≤ Q¯k and
uniform observability of the pair (C3,k, A¯k). The above
conditions with Assumptions 5.2, and 5.3 suffice the con-
dition of Theorem 4.5 in [20] (for the extended Kalman
filter) which ensures the existence of constants p and p¯
such that pI ≤ P xk = E[x˜kx˜Tk ] ≤ p¯I for all k ≥ 0. We
could apply the existing result because the update rule
of the extended Kalman filter is equivalent to the NISE
by Claim C.1. 
The equivalence to the extended Kalman filter is
achieved by the orthogonal output decompositions (8)
where their noise vectors are uncorrelated with each
others. This leads to the fact that process noise w¯k−1
and measurement noise v3,k in (22) are uncorrelated as
desired in the extended Kalman filtering problem.
9 Conclusion
We formulate the attack-resilient estimation of a class of
switched nonlinear stochastic systems as the problem of
joint estimation of the states, attack vectors and modes.
The proposed estimator, the NISME, consists of multiple
NISE and a mode estimator. Each NISE is able to gener-
ate state and attack estimates for a particular mode and
the mode estimator chooses the most likely one. Lastly,
the NISME uses the estimates of the selected mode as
outputs. We formally analyze the stability of estimation
errors in probability for the proposed estimator associ-
ated with the true mode under the time-invariant hid-
den mode. We propose a way to alleviate computational
complexity by reducing the number of modes. The esti-
mator performance for time-varying modes with a regu-
lar mode set and a reduced mode set is validated by the
numerical simulations on the IEEE 68-bus test system.
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